

lizing it, must finally be calculated and articulated in the way that a viewer sees and a listener hears. In connection, Dudley Andrew once again offers a helpful formulation.

In his 1983 book *Concepts of Film Theory*, Andrew surveys some of the theoretical approaches with which his first phenomenology article had taken at least implicit issue. Without rejecting these constructs out of hand, he also concludes that none, nor even all of them together, are ultimately sufficient.

The inclination to invoke philosophy, psychoanalysis, linguistics, logic or ideological theory in undertaking film study suggests not so much that film is ruled by other disciplines as the fact that films are the site of myriad problematics, involving multiple aspects of culture.⁵⁶

As for the problem of fusing all of these multiple and interdependent demands, Andrew comes at the end to hermeneutics, to cycles of interpretation and the final human factor as we account for our film experience. Texts call to us in ways that are, in the end, fundamentally human. And our responses, however analytical or informed by ostensibly objective theoretical models, are likewise “cries” of human aspiration.

What we do with [film expressions and models of cinematic interpretation] is as varied as the variety of interpreters and theories of interpretation. Yet doing anything with them whatsoever shows the interdependence of mind and body, of thought and voice, of meaning and expression. Certainly this is not an untroubled interdependence, but it is one that gives to viewing, reading, and writing a place in human life different from philosophy, analysis, or sheer behavior. This border zone of reading is the life of the imagination. It is worth as much as we imagine it to be.⁵⁷

Andrew’s border zone, and film phenomenology generally, is built on the emphasis on text and on viewer, and on the notion that it is at the borders between the two where meaning resides, and it is in the meeting between the two that it multiplies. It is also built on the affirmation that this subjective and variable site is valid, and valuable.

I will now discuss the historical grounding, as well as the theoretical implications, of phenomenology as it applies to classical music. To do so I will briefly return to the aims of Soviet mon-